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During the Civil War of the United States, opposing sides split the best military 
minds in the country and made them the leaders of their armies. The Confederacy 
established General Robert E. Lee as the commander in charge of the Army of the 
Confederacy in 1862, which he renamed the Army of Northern Virginia.1 The Union 
army, being entirely uncertain of which general would lead the army to a swift and quick 
victory, switched their leading commander several times. The first two years of the war 
saw many men as General-and-Chief o f all Union forces; one o f these men was General 
George McClellan. Although he did not remain General-and-Chief long, President 
Lincoln entrusted him with the leadership responsibility of Commander of the Army of 
the Potomac in 1861. General McClellan was considered an excellent general for 
organizing the troops. Yet though considered an excellent general, the Battle of Antietam 
was not a complete Union victory; it was a mere draw. It was a stalemate in that neither 
side achieved anything significant. General Lee did not continue on to invade the rest of 
Maryland and Pennsylvania as planned. However, McClellan also did not crush the Army 
of Northern Virginia, as was his intention. Why was this? What actions or lack thereof 
caused General McClellan to merely survive the Battle of Antietam as opposed to leading 
the Union Army to a glorious victory? In order to answer this question one must first 
identify the conditions and actions of the General prior to the battle itself.
Before the initial fighting began on September 16, 1862, General McClellan was 
having problems with his subordinate commanders, as well as making decisions about 
troop movement and mustering the confidence to fight the battle against the Confederacy 
at Antietam. However, on September 13, 1862, General McClellan was given a rare gift 
of war, which has become to be known as the Lost Orders. These written orders 
contained the exact location of General Lee’s troops, and they also stated that his troops 
would be divided into five separate sections. The orders were found by a Union solider 
simply by accident and were quickly advanced up the chain of command to General
http://www.civilwar.com/timebot.htm, date accessed April 6, 2005
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McClellan. For the general this came as a golden opportunity to destroy the Army of 
Northern Virginia. However, General McClellan, unsure of what specific actions to take 
did not move his troops into action until three and half days later, September 16, 1862. 
By this time General Lee had discovered that his plan was known and therefore had made 
preparations to reunite his troops. This caused General McClellan to lose an enormous 
opportunity to strike a fundamental blow at the Confederacy.2
Along with not taking advantage of the Lost Orders, General McClellan had 
another significant problem. When he finally decided to engage in battle with the Army 
of Northern Virginia he had problems communicating the entirety of the plan to his 
subordinate commanders. Reasons for this include the fact that he did not formulate a 
plan until September 16, 1862, and as he was doing so he neglected to hold a meeting to 
coordinate with the other generals. His initial plan was to simultaneously attack General 
Lee’s army with two flanks, in order to cut off his southern escape routes to the Potomac; 
by doing so he envisaged that it would be as if “pinching the enemy in a vice.”3 This 
strategy in itself may have worked, if he had effectively communicated the design to his 
troop commanders. However, without holding a large meeting of all the officers to 
explain his plan (he simply relayed the orders through a messenger), he left them in 
confusion as to the exact role their positions held. For example, if General Burnside and 
Corps Commander Cox had known that their flanking position was meant to act as a 
severe force against the rebel army perhaps they would have had a better outcome on 
September 17,1862. However, due to other circumstances, such as the ordered division 
of the First and Ninth Corps by General McClellan, there was tension and animosity 
between General Burnside and himself. This division also caused confusion pertaining to 
who was responsible for the orders from McClellan and what duties were to be upheld 
between General Burnside and Corps Commander Cox, because both men were present 
at the line and General Burnside had recently been demoted. General McClellan went on 
to further agitate Burnside and Cox by bringing in his staff engineers to inspect the 
ground and specifically mark out where the Ninth Corps was to be placed. This situation 
spurred animosity because prior to this all tactical decisions were left to the care of the 
generals.4 This would prove to be a significant problem for General McClellan, because 
the tension and anger brought on by splitting Burnside’s corps, changing commanders, 
and undermining Burnside’s and Cox’s command abilities augmented the 
miscommunication so that McClellan’s plan of attack was not understood to its entirety. 
This cost the Union army the lives of several thousand men.5
Furthermore, General McClellan was not only having communication issues with 
the commanders—he also had problems making accurate decisions of where to send the 
troops that he wanted to bring to Antietam Creek, the most likely site of the battle’s 
beginning. This constant run around is shown in his messages to Major General Franklin, 
in which he attempted to move Franklin from Harpers Ferry to support the troops at 
Antietam. However, Franklin at the same time asked for more troops, knowing that there 
were rebel troops at his location. This request was denied and General McClellan
2 Stephen W. Sears, ed., The Civil War Papers o f George B. McClellan Selected Correspondence 1860- 
1865, 434; Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon, 297-300.
3 Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon, 297-300.
4 Ibid., 299.
5 Ibid., 297-300.
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informed Major General Franklin through letters that the orders would be to march to 
Antietam. Yet, in his messages to the general he gave three positions for Franklin to 
move his troops to once they had arrived at Antietam. In the messages McClellan stated 
that each one of the positions would depend on where the Confederate troops would 
move. This is a clear indicator that since he had not acted on the Lost Orders, McClellan 
had effectively lost the location of General Lee’s troops.6 This uncertainty is also evident 
in a letter that General McClellan wrote to Major General Franklin on September 16, 
1862, The letter was written after information was relayed that the Union force, which 
was to be protecting the Maryland Heights area, had surrendered and rebel movement 
was seen heading back towards Harpers Ferry. General McClellan writes, “I think the 
enemy has abandoned the position in front of us, but the fog is so dense that I have not 
yet been enabled to determine.”7 This letter provides evidence that the Union army was 
doing poorly before the battle of Antietam began. It also further proves that McClellan 
did not fully utilize his original information of rebel troops.
A further cause of concern for General McClellan before the battle was that he did 
not have the entirety o f the troops with him at Antietam prepared to fight. His 
indecisiveness wasted time; by the time the decision was made the positive effect that it 
would have had on the battle was null and void. McClellan’s orders to Franklin did not 
have him begin his march to reinforce the troops until dawn of the morning of the battle; 
by the time the troops arrived to help the Union the battle was practically over.
A further problem that occurred before the Battle of Antietam was the 
misinformation given to the Union troops. This information applied to both the size and 
placement of General Lee’s troops. The miscalculation of the placement of Lee’s troops 
caused a significant problem for McClellan. In a letter to General-in-Chief Halleck, on 
September 13, 1862 General McClellan placed the rebel troops at approximately 
“ 120,000 men.” The letter goes on to state that these forces were headed to Harrisburg 
and Philadelphia.8 This caused him slight trepidation, but he insisted that they would 
advance to victory against Lee in a day or so. The next two days passed with McClellan 
ordering the troops to engage and drive off the rebel troops and to take mountain passes 
and towns if possible. Small victories were accomplished which increased morale, but in 
that time Lee’s troops began to regroup from their five different sections. General 
McClellan knew that since Lee’s plans were discovered he would alter his strategy to 
invade the North and probably regroup his troops for a decisive battle between the two 
main forces.9
General McClellan was still daunted by the supposed overwhelming numbers of 
the Army of Northern Virginia; for this reason he ordered several troops to remain 
cautious. This note o f caution was issued in McClellan’s letter to Major General Franklin 
on September 15, 1862. He wrote, “It is important to drive in the enemy in your front but 
be cautious in doing it until you have some idea of his force.”10 The fear o f being
6 Ibid., 300.
7 George McClellan, “September 16,1862 Letter to Major General Franklin," ed. Stephen W. Sears, The 
Civil War Papers o f George B. McClellan Selected Correspondence 1860-1865,466.
8 McClellan, “September 13, 1862 Letter to General-in-Chief Halleck", ed. Sears, The Civil War Papers, 
456.
9 Sears, The Civil War Papers, 458-464.
10 McClellan, “September 15, 1862 Letter to Major General Franklin,” ed. Sears, The Civil War Papers,
464.
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outnumbered was an unfortunate miscalculation by General McClellan in the events 
leading up to the Battle o f Antietam; his chief advisor, Fitz John Porter, informed him 
wrongly of Lee’s numbers. Not only was McClellan misinformed, his other commanding 
officers, who were present at the line of battle, also noted extremely large numbers from 
100,000 to 130,000. “The overwhelming numbers worried General McClellan, who only 
at best commanded an army of 95,000 men, only 75,000 of whom were capable of being 
put on the firing line. That General Lee would stand and fight with hardly 38,000 men 
(when his army was finally reunited) was to McClellan unimaginable.”11 From General 
McClellan’s perspective given the numerical calculations it was reasonable to be 
concerned about advancing out-manned and presumably out-gunned into battle with the 
enemy. By the time the battle began on September 17, 1862, General McClellan had 
already written General-in-Chief Halleck, seeking for reinforcements and further supplies 
including ammunition.12 Therefore General McClellan while noted for his organization 
was preoccupied by the supposedly large numerical advantage of Lee’s army along with 
his own depleting resources for his troops.
These concerns, along with pressure from Washington D.C., caused General 
McClellan to hesitate in the face of battle. McClellan’s general strategy of caution was 
also noted by his military and political superiors, such as Abraham Lincoln, even early in 
the War. President Lincoln in response to media questions of why he did not call for the 
resignation of General Grant, who was known for aggressive military action and who had 
recently suffered a great military defeat, stated that, “I can’t spare this man; he fights.”13 
This statement was a not so subtle comment towards General McClellan and the fact that 
he was hesitant to engage in battles with the troops of the Army of the Potomac. 
However, the disapproval of the President did not seem to weigh heavily enough on 
General McClellan’s mind, because six months after the statement was made General 
McClellan was still hesitating to engage in battle, this time at Antietam.
This view of McClellan constantly hesitating has remained consistent through the 
present day. The author of the article “Killing Zone at Burnside’s Bridge,” Robert Smith 
propagates the negative image of McClellan as a commanding officer by stating that he 
was “efficient in training, bold in planning, timid in battle.”14 This image is further 
developed by Stephen Sears, the author and editor of several books about McClellan 
including, George B. McClellan the Young Napoleon, and The Civil War Papers o f 
George B McClellan Selected Correspondence 1860-1865. From the chapter and letters 
published about the Battle of Antietam, Mr. Sears continues the negative image of 
General McClellan. He does so by listing the problems McClellan had prior to the battle 
and including other facts that show him to be ill prepared for battle, such as sleeping 
through the first hour of the battle on September 17, 1862. Sears also states that 
McClellan would have preferred not to fight the battle and that he hoped that the morning 
of the battle General Lee’s troops would be gone and the battle not fought.15 Thus
11 Sears, The Young Napoleon, 302-303.
12 McClellan, “September 16, 1862 Letter to General-in-Chief Halleck,” ed. Sears, The Civil War Papers, 
466.
13 http:/w ww.civilwar.'com/timebot.htm
14 Robert Smith, “Killing Zone at Burnside’s Bridge,” Military History, Vol. 21, Iss. 2; 2004, 34.
15 Sears, The Young Napoleon, 297.
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General McClellan’s consistent hesitation to go into battle has remained one of his 
defining qualities for over a century.
Well over a century has come and gone since the Battle of Antietam. It has been 
considered to be the single bloodiest day in American military history, 22,000 Americans 
were killed.16 Yet, with all of these deaths who won the battle? The conclusion has been 
that it was a draw, that no real victory was achieved. Why did General McClellan not win 
a sweeping victory? History has concluded that he had the manpower, the strategic 
advantage and the time in which to do so. As it has been shown General McClellan had a 
communication breakdown within his army. The first breakdown occurred when he 
missed his golden opportunity to strike a fundamental blow at the Confederate army 
using the Lost Orders. The second lack in communication occurred with the well planned 
but poorly explained attack at Antietam using simultaneous flanks to cut off escape 
routes for the enemy. This too caused a loss of a great opportunity to take advantage of 
Lee’s troops and their thin reinforcements. Thirdly, General McClellan was poorly 
informed about the numbers of the enemy, causing fear and hesitation, which also 
resulted in a breakdown of the plan, once again creating a missed opportunity to crush the 
Army Northern of Virginia. Prior to the battle General George McClellan had many 
opportunities to ensure the victory that the North was hoping to win. Had he not been 
hesitant, indecisive, and misinformed during the days leading up to and including the 
battle, the North may have won a decisive victory that may have changed the course of 
the war.
16 Smith, 34.
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